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Abstract
Life-cycle employment proﬁles of married women born between 1940 and 1960
shifted upwards and became ﬂatter. We calibrate a dynamic life-cycle model of
employment decisions of married women to assess the quantitative importance of
three competing explanations of the change in employment proﬁles: the decrease
and delay in fertility, the increase in relative wages of women to men, and the
decline in child-care costs. We ﬁnd that the decrease and delay in fertility and the
decline in child-care cost aﬀect employment very early in life, while increases in
relative wages aﬀect employment increasingly with age. Changes in relative wages,
in particular returns to experience, account for the bulk (67 percent) of changes in
life-cycle employment of married women.
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1 Introduction
In the United States, as well as in many other developed countries, life-cycle employment
proﬁles of married women born around mid-century changed in a noticeable way. Em-
ployment rates of women born in 1940 and earlier are low at childbearing ages (between
age 20 to 35) and increase over the life-cycle. Changes in employment across cohorts are
not uniform along the life-cycle, however. They are very pronounced at childbearing ages
and more modest at later ages. As a result, life-cycle employment proﬁles of women born
in 1960 not only shift upwards but also become much ﬂatter.
In this paper, we build a dynamic life-cycle model of employment decisions of married
women to assess the quantitative importance of three competing explanations of the
change in life-cycle employment proﬁles: the decrease and delay in fertility, the increase
in relative wages of women to men, and the decline in child-care costs. The incentives at
work are not new. First, because child-rearing is intensive in women’s time, employment
at childbearing ages increases as fertility is reduced. Second, postponing fertility allows
women to reach childbearing ages with a higher stock of accumulated work experience,
thereby increasing their incentives to remain employed when having children. Finally,
either an increase in women’s wages relative to men or a decline in the cost of child-care
makes working more attractive at childbearing ages, which feeds back on employment
decisions later on in life because of experience accumulation.
After calibrating the model to the life-cycle facts characterizing the 1940 cohort,
we show that the decrease and delay in fertility (both taken as exogenous here) and
the decline in child-care cost aﬀect employment very early in life, while increases in
relative wages aﬀect employment increasingly with age. Assuming that the three forces
account for 100 percent of the shift in life-cycle employment proﬁles, we ﬁnd that changes
in women’s wages (in particular, returns to experience) account for 67 percent of the
increase, versus 21 percent for cost of child-care, and 9 percent for fertility patterns (the
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residual term is equal to 2 percent). The eﬀects of the decrease and the delay in fertility
partly oﬀset each other. Here is how. Employment rates tend to increase following
a decrease in fertility since participation rates decrease with the number of children.
However, a delay in the timing of births increases the number of (costly) young children
in the household at later ages and therefore tends to decrease participation.
Our calibration procedure is new, as dynamic life-cycle models of employment deci-
sions of married women are often estimated using maximum likelihood techniques (e.g.,
Eckstein and Wolpin 1989, Van der Klauuw 1996, or Francesconi 2002, to name only a
few papers). Maximum likelihood is a more reﬁned statistical procedure since it takes
into account higher order moments, while we only match the average employment along
the life-cycle.1 Since large panel data sets are not available yet for the early cohorts we
consider, we use a sequence of cross-sectional data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) from 1962 to 2004. Hence, we do not have all the information necessary to perform
the maximum likelihood (i.e., conditional means and variances). We believe that calibrat-
ing the model is appropriate for the question at hand and ﬁnd that it yields surprisingly
good results. We obtain a very tight ﬁt not only for the entire life-cycle employment
proﬁle of the 1940 cohort, but also for the employment by number of children at various
ages. Moreover, we conduct sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our choice of
parameter values.
The contribution of our accounting exercise is clear. Three inﬂuential papers have
stressed the importance of changes in the pure gender wage gap (Jones, Manuelli, and
McGrattan 2003), changes in returns to experience (Olivetti 2006), and changes in child-
care costs relative to life-time earnings (Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos 2008) to
account for changes in women’s labor supply either over time or across cohorts. Since
our model nests these three potential explanations and adds another one (the decrease
1See Schoonbroodt (2002) and Eckstein and van den Berg (2005) for advantages and disadvantages
of maximum likelihood versus moments estimation.
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and delay in fertility), we can assess the quantitative importance of each of these forces
separately. We ﬁnd that they aﬀect employment of women in distinct age groups dif-
ferently and that changes in returns to experience have the largest impact on women’s
employment. Moreover, we show that a careful modeling of the distributions for number
and timing of births is fruitful. First, it allows us to match the entire life-cycle employ-
ment of married women born in 1940. Second, once we control for changes in fertility
patterns, exogenous changes in women’s wages and cost of children that are needed to
match changes in employment across cohorts are smaller in magnitude or larger but with
a smaller eﬀect on female labor supply compared to the ones found in Jones, Manuelli,
and McGrattan (2003) for the gender wage gap, Olivetti (2006) for returns to experience,
and Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) for decreases in the cost of child-care.
Numerous other explanations for the increase in employment of married women, either
over time or across cohorts, have been proposed. These include falling prices of home
appliances (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005), changes in the perceived value of
marriage (Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles 2002), the introduction of the pill (Goldin and
Katz 2002), changes in social norms (Fernandes, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004), tax reform
(Bar and Leukhina 2009), or gender-biased technological change favoring women (Galor
and Weil 1996), to name only a few. These papers are certainly important. However, it
is virtually impossible, let alone desirable, to include all of the aforementioned forces into
one single model. To perform our accounting exercise, we chose the ones which could be
modeled without too much controversy and seemed the most likely to inﬂuence women’s
employment decisions at childbearing ages.
A note on education is in order. For both cohorts of women (born in 1940 and 1960),
college educated women have higher participation rates than women with a high school
degree. Hence, part of the increase in the average participation rate of married women can
be attributed to the compositional shift from high school to college education. However,
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in the Appendix, we show that increases in employment rates are also the largest at
childbearing ages conditional on education levels. We then describe the total number
of children ever born and age at birth of ﬁrst child for women with diﬀerent education.
We ﬁnd similar patterns by education as for the average, i.e. fertility levels declined and
women have their ﬁrst child later. As a result, the increase in the fraction of women
with a college degree can only account for a fraction of the average increase in women’s
employment across cohorts. In this paper, we concentrate on the shift of the curve, rather
than underlying compositional changes.
The paper is built as follows. In Section 2, we present evidence for the change in
life-cycle patterns of employment and fertility for two cohorts of married women born in
the United States in 1940 and 1960. In Section 3, we describe a dynamic life-cycle model
of employment decisions of married women with experience accumulation. In Section 4,
we explain our procedure for the calibration of the model. In Section 5, we perform the
accounting exercise and, ﬁnally, we provide some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Data
We use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the survey years 1964-2003
and from the decennial Census for the survey years 1970-2000 to describe the life-cycle
patterns of employment and fertility for two cohorts of married women born in the United
States in 1940 and 1960.2
2.1 Employment
In Figure 1, we present the average employment by age for married women born in 1940
and 1960. We count as employed, any woman who was at work during the week preceding
2All raw data was downloaded from the Integrated Public Use Micro-data Series (IPUMS) available
at http://www.ipums.org.
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the interview or has a job but was not at work last week due to illness, vacations, etc.
We pool data for women born within a three year interval (i.e., women born from 1939
to 1941 for the 1940 cohort and from 1959 to 1961 for the 1960 cohort) for the number
of observations to be large enough at each age and we present both raw data as well as
smoothed life-cycle employment proﬁles. Employment rates for women are low during
childbearing ages (between age 20 to 35) and progressively increase over the life-cycle.
Changes in employment rates across cohorts, however, diﬀer in magnitudes along the life-
cycle and are the largest at childbearing ages. Employment rates increased on average
by 24 percentage points between age 20 and 35, compared to only 11 percentage points
between age 36 and 50 (see Table 1). This fact is the focus of our analysis.
Fig. 1: Life-Cycle Employment Proﬁle of Married Women by Cohort
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2.2 Fertility
We use Census data for the years between 1980 and 2000 to describe the distributions
for the total number of children ever born and the age of mother at birth of ﬁrst child of
married women born in 1940 and 1960. We consider married women at age 40, assuming
that fertility is close to completion at that age, and record the fraction with 0, 1,..., 4+
children, where 4+ denotes married women with at least 4 children. On average, women
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Tab. 1: Employment Rates of Married Women by Cohort and
Age Group
Age 20-35 a Age 36-50 b Age 20-50 c,d
1940 Cohort 37 62 52
1960 Cohort 61 73 65
Change (in pct. points) +24 +11 +13
aAge 24-35 for 1940 cohort. bAge 36-43 for 1960 cohort. cAge 24-50
for 1940 cohort. dAge 20-43 for 1960 cohort.
born in 1940 had 2.6 children by age 40, while those born in 1960 had 1.9 (see Table 2).
Moreover, the decrease in the total number of children ever born mainly occurred from
a redistribution of mass away from 3 and 4 children towards 0, 1, and 2 children (see
Figure 2).
The age at birth of ﬁrst child is not directly reported as part of the Census data.
We use the age of the mother and the age of oldest child in the household to calculate
a proxy for age of mother at birth of ﬁrst child. For each number of children ever born,
f ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4+}, we record the fraction of women who have their ﬁrst child at age
a ∈ {20, 21, ..., 40}. On average, women born in 1940 had their ﬁrst child at age 23, while
those born in 1960 had their ﬁrst child three and a half years later (see Table 2). The
increase in the average age at birth of ﬁrst child can be decomposed into two components:
ﬁrst, for any given level of completed fertility the average age increased across cohorts
(see Figure 3); second, women who have many children tend to have their ﬁrst child
early and the fraction of women with 3 and 4 children (having children early) decreased
while the fraction of women with 0, 1, and 2 children (having children late) increased
(see Figures 2 and 3).
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Tab. 2: Fertility Levels and Timing of Births by Cohort - (Std. Dev.)
Cohort 1940 Cohort 1960
Total Number of Children Ever Born : 2.6 (1.2) 1.9 (1.1)
Age of Mother at Birth of First Child: 23.2 (2.9) 26.7 (4.7)
Fig. 2: Completed Fertility by Cohort
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Fig. 3: Timing of Births by Completed Fertility and Cohort
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2.3 Crossing Employment and Fertility
To understand how changes in the total number of children ever born and the age of
mother at birth of ﬁrst child aﬀect employment rates along the life-cycle, we describe the
employment decisions by number of children in the household at age 30 and 40 for our
two cohorts (see Figures 4 and 5).
Focusing on the behavior of the 1940 cohort, it is clear that women’s employment
at age 30 is decreasing in the number of children in the household and that this eﬀect
is stronger for the ﬁrst child. Note from Table 2 that the total number of children ever
born decreased from 2.6 to 1.9 children per woman. Based on this fact alone, women’s
employment can increase across cohorts, due to a movement along a downward sloping
curve. However, employment at age 30 also increased across cohorts for any given number
of children. As childbirth is postponed, the fraction of women who used to have 2, 3,
4+ children at age 30 decreased and employment decreases with the number of children.
Moreover, women born in 1960 are also more likely to have accumulated more work
experience before childbearing, and therefore, are less likely to drop out of labor markets
when having children. As a result, changes in the timing of births can account for the
upward shift of the employment curve across cohorts. To assess the latter eﬀect, a model
of employment and experience accumulation is needed.
Finally, we present employment rates by total number of children ever born for married
women at age 40 in Figure 5.3 We ﬁnd that, at least qualitatively, employment at age 40
also decreases with the number of children and that it increased across cohorts for any
number of children. However, quantitatively, the impact of children on employment is
not as strong as the one at age 30, as the diﬀerential in employment rates between women
with no children and women with 4 children is much smaller than the same diﬀerence for
3We assume that women are no longer fertile after age 40 and present employment by number of
children ever born rather than employment by number of children in the household.
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women at age 30.
Fig. 4: Employment of Married Women at Age 30 by Number of Children and Cohort
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Fig. 5: Employment of Married Women at Age 40 by Number of Children and Cohort
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3 A Life-Cycle Model
In this section, we build the aforementioned economic mechanisms into a life-cycle model
of employment decisions of married women with heterogenous agents and experience
accumulation. Our model is close to Eckstein and Wolpin (1989).
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3.1 Household’s Maximization Problem
Demographics and Fertility: Men and women live with certainty for T periods and women
are fertile for Tf < T periods. Fertility is exogenous and women diﬀer in the total number
of children they have in a life-time, f ∈ {0, 1, ..., fmax}, and in the age at which they have
their ﬁrst child, a.4 We ﬁx the spacing of births to 2 years, so that the timing of all births
is fully characterized by women’s permanent type, (f, a): women of type f ≥ 1 can have
their ﬁrst child by age Tf −2(f −1) at the latest. Women know their type with certainty
at the beginning of their life.
Preferences: Households derive utility from market consumption, ct, and leisure time,
lt. We assume that the period-t utility, U(ct, lt), is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable,
increasing, and concave in both arguments, ct and lt.
Dynamic Optimization Problem: We model employment decisions of married women
as a discrete choice, et ∈ {0, 1}.5 At each age t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, women receive a wage
oﬀer, wt(ht, t), which depends positively on work experience accumulated up to period t,
ht, and a contemporaneous productivity shock, t. Women who accept the wage oﬀer, i.e.
et = 1, devote a ﬁxed fraction of her time, tw ∈ (0, 1), to market activities and gain an
additional year of work experience. The law of motion of work experience and women’s
wage oﬀers are given by:
ht+1 = ht + et (1)
4Heckman and Walker (1990) ﬁnd that the strongest eﬀect of wages and costs of children operate
through the time of the ﬁrst birth.
5Since changes in women’s labor supply across cohorts mainly occur at the extensive margin, this
assumption is ﬁne as a starting point. However, recent work by Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2005)
shows that, among working women, those who have children work fewer hours than the ones without
children. Alternatively, Francesconi (2002) proposes a life-cycle model of women’s labor supply and
fertility where women can choose between working part-time or full-time. He ﬁnds that mothers prefer
to interrupt their careers for a short time around childbirth rather than working on a part-time basis.
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and
ln(wt(ht, t)) = β0 + β1ht + β2h
2
t + t (2)
where t is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation, σ
2
 , and is i.i.d.
over time.6 We do not model joint participation decisions between husbands and wives.
Men work with certainty in each period and their (deterministic) wage in period t is
equal to wmt.
7 Given the time discount factor, δ ∈ (0, 1), women of type (f, a) choose
employment, et, to maximize the expected discounted utility, Et−1
∑T
s=t δ
s−tU(cs, ls),
subject to a sequence of budget and time constraints and the law of motion for work
experience. In period t, the budget and time constraints are given by:
ct + g(f, a, et) ≤ wmt + wt(ht, t)et
lt + ettw + t(f, a, et) = 1
et ∈ {0, 1}
(3)
where the time-invariant functions, g(·, ·, ·) and t(·, ·, ·), denote the goods and time cost of
children, respectively. Notice that we model the costs of children carefully, allowing them
to depend on the age of children and women’s participation choices. Following the work
of Hotz and Miller (1988), we assume that both functions are increasing in the number
of children and decreasing in age of children. On the other hand, goods costs increase
with participation, while time costs decrease. This reﬂects the necessity of some sort of
(paid) child-care when the woman works.
Our model abstracts from several important features. First, households cannot borrow
or lend, implying that the only way to smooth consumption over the life-cycle is through
women’s labor supply.8
6We further discuss the i.i.d. assumption below.
7Husband’s wages are realized only after women’s participation is made in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989)
or Van der Klaauw (1996). Since they assume that utility is linear in consumption, women’s participation
decisions depend on husband’s expected income.
8Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) study a life-cycle model of women’s employment with
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Second, there is no depreciation in skills when women drop out of labor markets
and only the stock of accumulated work experience, as opposed to the entire history
of past employment decisions, matters to determine the average wage oﬀers. Although
these assumptions considerably reduce the dimension for the state space, Altug and
Miller (1998) show that recent work experience is more valuable than distant one to
determine women’s wage oﬀers.
Third, there are no permanent diﬀerences in women’s market ability (ﬁxed eﬀects).
Francesconi (2002) and Heckman and Walker (1990) ﬁnd that high ability women are
more likely to postpone fertility. Similarly, Van der Klaauw (1996) and Caucutt, Guner,
and Knowles (2002) show that women with high market ability tend to postpone marriage
(they wait for a suitable match), which, in turn, inﬂuences the age at which they have
their ﬁrst child and their employment decisions along the life-cycle. We brieﬂy address
this issue in Section 4.2.
Also, we assume that women’s wage shocks are i.i.d. over time. The i.i.d assumption
considerably reduces the dimension of the state space since we only need to keep track
of the current productivity shock.9 However, since work experience is endogenous in our
model, women’s wages are endogenously serially correlated across periods even though
productivity shocks are i.i.d..10
Finally, note that husband’s wages are deterministic. One reason for women born in
1960 to be more attached to the labor market than women born in 1940 could be an
increase in male income risk (see Sommer 2010). We abstract from this mechanism to
focus on the eﬀect of relative wage changes, changes in the price of child-care and, most
borrowing and savings. They show that the elasticity of women’s employment increases once savings
and borrowing are allowed.
9Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Guvenen (2005) reject the hypothesis that men’s wage shocks are
i.i.d over time and ﬁnd strong empirical support for permanent and transitory wage shocks.
10Note that, if the woman works every period, work experience coincides with age and equation (2)
boils down to a simple Mincer equation.
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importantly, the decrease and delay in fertility on female labor force participation.
3.2 Dynamic Program
We denote by Vt(h, ; θ) the maximum expected life-time utility discounted back to period
t for women of type θ = (f, a), who are in state (h, ). The household maximization
problem can be formulated as a dynamic program, whose Bellman equation is given by:
Vt(h, ; θ) = max
et∈(0,1)
{
U(c, l) + δEtVt+1
(
h′, ′; θ)
}
(4)
subject to the law of motion (1), the earnings equation (2), and the budget and time
constraints (3). Plugging the budget and time constraints into women’s utility, we deﬁne
the function, W ett (h, θ, ), as:
W ett (h, θ, ) = U(wmt + wt(h, )et − g(f, a, et), 1− ettw − t(f, a, et))
+ δEtVt+1
(
h + et, 
′, θ)
(5)
Notice that W 0t is independent of t, while W
1
t is an increasing concave function of t. As
a result, there exists a reservation productivity shock, ∗(h, βi, θ), such that women are
indiﬀerent between working and not-working, i.e. W 0t (h, θ) = W
1
t (h, θ, 
∗
t ), and women
work if and only if t ≥ ∗t (h, βi, θ).11 In the Appendix, we derive the comparative statics of
the productivity threshold. We show that, holding everything else the same, it decreases
with work experience and the coeﬃcients of Mincer wage equation, while it increases with
the total number of children. As a result, life-cycle employment rates unambiguously
increase following a left-shift in the distribution of total number of children ever born,
or an increase in the coeﬃcients of the Mincer wage equation, (β0, β1, β2). A shift in the
distribution towards delay in fertility increases employment early on. However, there are
two counterbalancing eﬀects for later ages: (1) women born in 1960 are more likely to
11Note that, because of the i.i.d. assumption, the contemporaneous productivity shock enters the
expression in (5) only once, through the woman’s wage oﬀer.
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work since they have accumulated more work experience, (2) they are less likely to work
since eventually they will have younger (i.e. more costly) children.
We solve the dynamic program using a standard backward induction procedure, as-
suming that the continuation value in period T + 1 is a function of work experience,
VT+1(h). Given the expression for 
∗
t , the expected utility at time t− 1 is equal to:
Et−1Vt(h, θ) = Φ
(
∗t (h, θ)
)
W 0t (h, θ) +
∫
∗t (h,θ)
W 1t (h, θ, )φ()d (6)
where φ and Φ denote the probability density function and the normal cumulative distri-
bution for the productivity shocks. We use the functions t and EtVt+1 to calculate the
aggregate employment rates over the life-cycle in three steps. First, since women work
when the productivity shock is higher than the reservation productivity, the average
employment for women of type θ is equal to:
pt(h, θ) = 1− Φ(∗(h, θ)) (7)
Second, we calculate the fraction of women, µt(h, θ), of type θ who have accumulated
h years of work experience at the beginning of period t. It is given by the following
formula:12
µt+1(h, θ) = µt(h, θ)
(
1− pt(h, θ)
)
+ µt(h− 1, θ)pt(h− 1, θ) (8)
with initial condition µ1(0, θ) = 1 and µ1(h, θ) = 0 for h > 0. Finally, the aggregate
employment rate of married women in period t is equal to:
Pt =
∑
(h,θ)
ϕ(θ)µt(h, θ)pt(h, θ) (9)
where ϕ(θ) denotes the distribution over fertility types.
12The law of motion for µ is given by: µt+1(h, θ) = µt(h, θ)
(
1− pt(h, θ)
)
for women who have no prior
work experience, i.e. h = 0. On the other hand, it is equal to µt+1(h, θ) = µt(h − 1, θ)pt(h − 1, θ) for
women who have worked in all periods, i.e. h = t.
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4 Calibration: 1940 Birth Cohort
In this section, we calibrate our model to the life-cycle facts characterizing the 1940 co-
hort.13 We stress the importance of the distributions for the number and timing of births
presented in the data section. Although dynamic discrete choice life-cycle models are
usually estimated using maximum likelihood techniques (e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin 1989,
Van der Klauuw 1996, or Francesconi 2002), the calibration yields surprisingly good re-
sults. We obtain a very tight ﬁt not only for the entire life-cycle employment proﬁle of
the 1940 cohort, but also for the employment by number of children at various ages. We
report sensitivity analysis in the Appendix.
4.1 Parameter Values
1. Demographics & Fertility : The model period is one year. We consider women
between age 20 to 60, i.e. T = 41. We assume that women are fertile between age
20 to 40, so Tf = 21. We set the maximum number of children, fmax = 4, so that
women can have f ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} children. We characterize the joint distribution
ϕ(θ) in equation (9) using the distributions of number and timing of births for the
1940 cohort. Let ϕ1940f (f) the marginal distribution of total number of children
ever born as presented in Figure 2 of the data section and ϕ1940a|f (a) the conditional
distribution of the age of mother at birth of ﬁrst child as presented in Figure 3.
Then, the joint distribution in equation (9) is equal to: ϕ(θ) = ϕ1940f (f)ϕ
1940
a|f (a).
2. Preferences : Agents’ utility is separable between consumption and leisure and is of
13The calibration tool was introduced by Prescott (1986) and Kydland and Prescott (1982). It is now
widely used in macroeconomics to assess the quantitative importance of dynamic general equilibrium
model. Hansen and Heckman (1996) examine the empirical foundations of calibration.
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the constant relative risk aversion form (CRRA). The period-t utility is given by:
U(ct, lt) =
(ct)
1−σc − 1
1− σc + A
(lt)
1−σl − 1
1− σl (10)
for all values of σc and σl diﬀerent from 1 and
U(ct, lt) = ln(ct) + A ln(lt) (11)
when σc = σl = 1. A is a positive constant. Following Keane and Wolpin (2001)
and Imai and Keane (2004), we set σc = 0.52, which implies a high value for
the intertempotal elasticity of substitution in consumption (IESC) compared to
previous studies.14 They ﬁnd that the introduction of borrowing constraints in life-
cycle models signiﬁcantly increase the value for IESC. We set σl = 1. This implies a
Frisch elasticity of labor supply for women with zero children of 1
σl
lt
tw
= 0.64
0.36
= 1.78
and lower values for those with children (where leisure is decreased due to the
time cost of children). These values are in line with estimates from Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante (2010)15 who use a similar model, albeit with intensive
margin labor supply decisions. Sensitivity analysis shows that the model predictions
crucially depend on the value of σc and σl.
3. Costs of Children: The goods and time cost of children functions, g(f, a, es) and
14With CRRA utility, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (IESC) is equal to
the inverse of the coeﬃcient of risk aversion, σc (see Kimball 1990). Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994)
survey the literature on life-cycle consumption, savings, and wealth accumulation and conclude that a
conventional value for σc is equal to 3, which implies a value for IESC of
1
3 . They do not consider,
however, imperfection in capital markets.
15See page 702, footnote 22.
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t(f, a, es), are given by:
g(f, a, es)
wmt
= g1ns(f, a)
η + g2es
ns(f,a)∑
i=1
ρs−ai
t(f, a, es) = (t1 + t2(1− es))
ns(f,a)∑
i=1
ρs−ai ,
with (g1, g2, t1, t2, ρ, η) ∈ (0, 1)6
(12)
where ns(f, a) denotes the number of costly children in the household at time s and
ai = a + 2(i − 1) denotes the age of the ith child. Notice that the goods cost of
children is expressed as a fraction of husband’s income and includes a base cost, g1,
and an additional cost, g2, when women work. We interpret the latter as market
child-care costs that arise when women work and have to ﬁnd someone else to look
after their child. We experiment on this parameter in relation to Attanasio, Low,
and Sanchez-Marcos (2008).
Since η < 1, there are economies of scale in the goods cost of children. Similarly,
the time cost of children includes a base cost, t1 as well as an additional cost, t2,
when women do not work. Following Hotz and Miller (1988), we assume that the
time costs of children decreases at rate, ρ < 1, when children grow. Finally, we
assume that children are costly until age 13.
We use evidence and estimates from the microeconometrics literature to calibrate
the parameters for the costs of children: (g1, g2, t1, t2, ρ, η). Our main reference is
Hotz and Miller (1988) who use a structural life-cycle model to estimate the time
and goods of children. First, they ﬁnd that the time cost of children decreases
at rate 0.89 with age of children. Accordingly, we ﬁx ρ = 0.89. Second, we set
g1 = 0.09 and g2 = 0.07. This is in the upper range of Hotz and Miller estimates,
who ﬁnd that the goods cost per child per week ranges from 11 to 17 percent of
husband’s income.16 Third, we ﬁx t1 = 0.10 and t2 = 0.06, which compares well
16Note that it is very common to ﬁnd wide ranges of goods cost estimates in the literature. See also
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to their estimates. They ﬁnd that the time cost of a newborn is about 13 percent
of a woman’s time after sleeping and eating hours have been subtracted.17 Finally,
Lazear and Michael (1980) ﬁnd large economies of scale, while Espenshade (1984)
ﬁnd that they are of the order of ﬁve percent for an additional child. We take an
intermediate stand and ﬁx η = 0.92.
4. Discount factor : We set δ = 0.96 to match an annual interest rate of roughly 4%.
5. Male Wages: We calculate the average weekly wage by age for married men born
in 1940.18 Assuming that men participate in labor markets in all period with
probability one, we ﬁt the average observed wage of men over the life-cycle using a
polynomial equation of degree 4:
ln(wm,age) = β0m + β1mage+ β2mage
2 + β3mage
3 + β4mage
4 (13)
We ﬁnd the following parameters values: β0m = 5.7083, β1m = 0.0805, β2m =
−0.0042, β3m = 0.0001, β4m = −9.4218e−7.
6. Workweek length: From time-use data (see Juster and Staﬀord 1991), people use
on average 8 hours a day for sleeping and 2 for eating which leaves 98 hours per
week to devote to work, leisure,.... From CPS data, the average workweek length
for married women (conditional on being employed) is 35 hours a week. Therefore,
tw = 35/98 = 0.36 (see Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005).
Bernal (2004) who ﬁnds a comparable wide range for child-care expenditures.
17Hill and Staﬀord (1980) analyzing time use data in 1976 ﬁnd that women spend 550 minutes per
child per week in child-care if they have one preschooler and 440 minutes per child per week if they have
two (p.237). This corresponds to about 10 percent of a woman’s total time after sleeping and eating
hours have been subtracted. However, housework time can to some extent be viewed as time spent where
watching children is possible at the same time.
18The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides individual data on total labor income earned in the
previous calendar year as well as weeks worked last year. Weekly wages are then total labor income
divided by weeks worked.
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7. Women’s Wages, Terminal Condition, and Marginal Utility of Leisure: We assume
that the continuation value function in period T + 1 depends on work experience
and is of the following form: VT+1(h) = a1h
a2 with a1 > 0 and a2 > 0.
For women’s wages, we ﬁrst use Guvenen (2005)’s estimates for the variance of the
productivity shocks and ﬁx σ2 = 0.061. Second, due to non-random selection of
married women into the labor market, the wage coeﬃcients of the Mincer equation,
(β0, β1, β2), are potentially biased.
To address this problem, we choose women’s wage coeﬃcients, marginal utility of
leisure, and parameters for the continuation value, i.e. ψ = {β0, β1, β2, A, a1, a2}, to
minimize the squared deviation between the life-cycle employment rates from the
model, {Pt(ψ; ξ)}50t=24, and their data counterpart for the 1940 cohort, {P d,1940t }50t=24:
Qc(ψ; ξc) =
∑
t
Φ−1t,t (Pt(ψ; ξ
c)− P d,1940t )2 (14)
where the elements of the weighting matrix, Φ−1, are equal to the variance of partici-
pation rates over the life-cycle on the diagonal and zero otherwise. The vector of cal-
ibrated parameters, ξc, is equal to: ξc = {{ϕ1940f }, {ϕ1940a|f }, σc, σl, g1, g2, t1, t2, ρ, η, δ,
{βmi }, tw, σ}.19
Notice that the system in equation (14) is over-identiﬁed since we have 27 moments
to determine 6 parameters. As a result, we cannot match all the moments perfectly.
However, the ﬁt between moments and data is good as the minimum distance for
the quadratic form is equal to 0.01, i.e. Qc(ψc; ξc) = 0.01 (see Table 3). We ﬁnd
that β0 = 5.3117, β1 = 0.0105, and β2 = −2.04e−4. Previous studies also ﬁnd the
sign of β1 and β2 to be positive and negative. However, our estimates are smaller
19We use the downhill simplex method to solve for the optimal vector, ψc = argmin
ψ∈Ψ
Qc(ψ; ξc), which
requires only function evaluations, not derivatives, and is eﬃcient when the size of the simplex is small
(see Nelder and Mead 1965).
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than estimates from traditional Mincer regressions.20 Finally, A = 21.65, a1 = 1.19
and a2 = 0.44.
Tab. 3: Calibrated Wage Parameters
β0 β1 β2 Q
c(ψc(·); ξc(·))
5.3117 0.0105 -2.04e−4 0.01
4.2 Cohort 1940: Model versus Data
In this section, we compare the model predictions versus data for calibrated moments
as well as non-ﬁtted moments. We ﬁrst address participation and experience related
predictions. Second, we discuss wage predictions.
4.2.1 Participation and Experience
The calibrated life-cycle employment proﬁle is quite close to the data (see Figure 6). We
also explore other predictions of the model for moments that we did not calibrate directly.
First, the model slightly over-predicts employment by number of children at age 30,
while the ﬁt is almost perfect at age 40 (see Figures 7 and 8, respectively).
Second, since employment rates decrease with the number of children, women with
fewer children tend to accumulate a greater number of years of work experience (see
Figure 9). At age 20, women start with no work experience. By age 50, the experience
gap between women who have no children and those who have 4+ children is greater
20This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), who show that simple wage
regressions on female wages yield biased estimates because of non-random selection in labor markets
and experience accumulation. They ﬁnd that, when using a structural model of women’s employment
decisions, the coeﬃcient on experience and experience squared in the Mincer equation, β1 and β2, are
equal to 0.0241 and −2.4e−4, respectively, compared to 0.037 and −5e−4 in simple wage regressions.
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Fig. 6: Calibrated Life-Cycle Employment of Married Women - 1940 Cohort
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Fig. 7: Employment at Age 30 by Total Number of Children Ever Born - 1940 Cohort
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than 11 years of work experience. All of the above ﬁndings suggest that shifts in the
distribution of completed fertility (total number of children ever born in a life-time) as
shown in Figure 2 in the data section potentially account for a large part of the increase
in participation across cohorts. We quantify this statement in the next section.
22
Fig. 8: Employment at Age 40 by Total Number of Children Ever Born - 1940 Cohort
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Fig. 9: Life-Cycle Years of Work Experience by Total Number of Children Ever Born -
1940 Cohort
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4.2.2 Wages
We next address the model’s predictions for the average observed wage over the life-cycle
(see Figure 10) and the average observed wage by total number of children ever born at
age 40 (see Figure 11).21 Although we match the average wage over the life-cycle, the
model overstates wages at early ages and fails to capture the increase in wages at later
ages. Qualitatively, wages at age 40 decrease with the number of children. Quantitatively,
however, children have a much smaller impact on wages than in the data.
We discuss these patterns in three points. First, we explain in what sense the ﬁt is
actually surprisingly good. Second, we explain the selection mechanism in our model
that leads to the simulated wage pattern. Third, we discuss how introducing ﬁxed eﬀects
could provide a better ﬁt—but at a cost.
First, wages are not a target in the calibration. Therefore, we would not expect them
to be matched perfectly. Now, one important feature that is captured by our simulation
is that average wages of married women by far do not grow as much as men’s or single
women’s wages. In particular, as can be seen in Figure 10, there is no growth in average
wages until age 40. In fact, our mechanism dampens average wage growth so much that
the overall pattern is slightly decreasing in the model as opposed to slightly increasing in
the data.
Second, Figure 12 shows model predicted wages by fertility type (0,1,2,3 or 4+). Note
that we cannot plot the data counterpart to this since the CPS is not a panel data set
and the researcher cannot observe how many children a woman will end up with. It is an
instructive ﬁgure to understand where the average wage pattern comes from, however.
As can be seen, women who know they will have 0 children over their lifetime, don’t
expect to ever drop out of the labor force for reasons other than wage shocks. Hence they
behave very much like men in standard life-cycle labor supply models and their wages
21We normalize wages by number of children by the wage of women with 0 children.
24
Fig. 10: Life-Cycle Weekly Wages of Married Women - 1940 Cohort
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Fig. 11: Wages at Age 40 by Total Number of Children Ever Born - 1940 Cohort
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grow over the life-cycle. For women who expect to have 4 or more children, they also
tend to have them early. Therefore, there is little incentive for them to work early in
life (i.e. worth giving up any more leisure than they are already giving up due to time
costs of children), unless they get a really high wage shock. Hence, while participation
for this type of woman is low, average accepted wages are high. This eﬀect is decreasing
in the number of children the woman expects to have over her lifetime. It is this kind
of selection, that drives the average wage up during childbearing ages. As the life-cycle
goes on, more and more women with many children join the labor force (as the marginal
value of their leisure falls due to falling time costs of children). These women have very
little experience, however, and hence low wages. By age 40, the wages are decreasing by
number of children but only ever so slightly as can be seen in Figure 11.22
Fig. 12: Model Predicted Life-Cycle Weekly Wages of Married Women by Number of
Children
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Third, our formulation misses out on an important dimension, namely that higher
ability women (e.g., college educated women) tend to have children later and to have
fewer. One way to account for this fact is to introduce ﬁxed eﬀects as an additional
22A similar selection problem exists in Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) and hence, the
same problem of matching the wage pattern (compare Figures 8 and 12).
26
source of heterogeneity (i.e., market ability, βi0) and to allow for market ability to be
positively correlated with age at birth of ﬁrst child (which itself is negatively correlated
with number of children). In such a model we ﬁnd that the higher the correlation between
market ability and age at birth of ﬁrst child, the faster average wages fall as the number of
children increases (addressing the the problem in Figure 11). The drawback of introducing
ﬁxed eﬀects, however, is that changes in the distribution of ability types (i.e., wage
levels) also change fertility related distributions, and vice versa. Hence counterfactual
experiments such as those we perform in Section 5 are hard to interpret and call for
arbitrary adjustments, unless independence is assumed. But under independence the
aforementioned additional eﬀect disappears. We therefore chose to use only one ability
type, implicitly assuming independence.23
5 Experiments: 1960 Cohort
Three inﬂuential papers have stressed the importance of changes in the pure gender
wage gap (Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan 2003), changes in returns to experience
(Olivetti 2006), and changes in child-care costs relative to life-time earnings (Attana-
sio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos 2008) to account for changes in women’s labor supply
either over time or across cohorts. In this section, we assess the quantitative importance
of these 3 forces as follows.
Taking changes in fertility patterns into account, we use our model to quantify what
changes in women’s wages and child-care cost are needed to match the life-cycle par-
ticipation choices of women born in 1960. Using distributions for number and timing
23Introducing ﬁxed eﬀects becomes useful in a model with endogenous fertility, where high ability
women choose to have fewer children and to have them later. As a result, a change in wages (or the
distribution of abilities) will aﬀect both, fertility choices and participation decisions, and no arbitrary
adjustments are needed. This is the object of work in progress by the authors.
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of births of the 1960 cohort, we choose the pure gender wage gap, β0 (relative to β0m),
the returns to experience, β1, β2, and the cost of child-care, g2, to match the life-cycle
employment rates of the 1960 cohort, holding all other calibrated parameters constant.
We set the vector, ψ = {β0, β1, β2, g2}, to minimize the following quadratic form:
Qe(ψ; ξe) =
∑
t
Φ−1t,t (Pt(ψ; ξ
e)− P d,1960t )2 (15)
where ξe = {{ϕ1960f }, {ϕ1960a|f }, σc, σl, A, g1, t1, t2, ρ, η, δ, {βmi }, tw, σ, a1, a2}.
Let ψe = argmin
ψ∈Ψ
Qe(ψ; ξe), the solution to the above system. This exercise allows us to
answer questions such as: taking into account changes in fertility patterns, by how much
do the coeﬃcients of women’s Mincer wage equation and child-care cost need to change
to explain the observed patterns in women’s employment?
Our model has the same qualitative predictions as in Jones, Manuelli, and McGrat-
tan (2003), Olivetti (2006), or Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008). The pure
gender wage gap and the child-care cost decrease, while returns to experience increase
across cohorts in order to match changes in women’s employment across cohorts (see
Table 4). Quantitatively, the pure gender wage gap decreases, i.e. β0 increases by less
than 1 percent, returns to experience increase as the coeﬃcient on experience, β1, and
experience squared, β2, increase by 42 percent and 21 percent, respectively, and ﬁnally
the price of child-care, g2, decreases by 18.5 percent. We compare these ﬁndings to the
literature below.
Tab. 4: Wages & Child-Care Costs Needed to Match
Life-Cycle Employment of 1960 Cohort
β0 β1 β2 g2 Q
e(ψe(·); ξe(·))
5.3217 0.0149 -1.61e−4 0.057 0.06
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The ﬁt for life-cycle employment proﬁle of the 1960 cohort following changes in wage
and fertility is good (see Figure 13). Since the increase in participation rates occurs
mainly for women with 1 and 2 children, the experience gap between women with 0 and
1 child is less than 1.5 years at age 43 compared to more than 5 years for women born in
1940 (see Figure 16). Finally, employment at age 30 increases the most for women with
1 and 2 children and we overshoot for participation of women with 0 and 1 child at age
40 (see Figures 14 and 15).
Fig. 13: Employment over the Life-Cycle - 1960 Cohort
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Fig. 14: Employment by Total Number of Children Ever Born at Age 30 - 1960 Cohort
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Fig. 15: Employment by Total Number of Children Ever Born at Age 40 - 1960 Cohort
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Fig. 16: Number of Years of Work Experience over the Life-Cycle by Total Number of
Children Ever Born - 1960 Cohort
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Since we implicitly assumed that changes in fertility patterns, gender wage diﬀeren-
tials, and cost of child-care account for 100-percent of changes in women’s employment
across cohorts, we perform a decomposition exercise to assess their relative (quantitative)
importance. We write:
1 = ∆(Fertility) + ∆(Wages) + ∆(Child-Care) + R (16)
where changes in fertility include changes in number and timing of births, changes in
wages include changes in the pure gender wage gap and returns to experience, and R
is a residual term to account for potential interaction between all the variables. We
present the results of the decomposition exercise for various age groups in Figure 17 and
Table 5. In each experiment, we change some parameters to their 1960-cohort values,
holding all other parameters at their 1940-cohort values. That is, for A.Fertility, we
change both the distributions of level and timing of births as per Figures 2 and 3, holding
β0, β1, β2 and g2 at their 1940-cohort values. This experiment is further decomposed into
a.Number holding β0, β1, β2 and g2 as well as timing of births at their 1940-cohort values
and b.Timing holding β0, β1, β2 and g2 as well as number of children at their 1940-cohort
values. For B.Wages, we change β0, β1 and β2 to their 1960-cohort values holding g2
as well as number and timing of births at their 1940-cohort values. This experiment is
further decomposed into a.Pure wage gap where only β0 is changed to its 1960-cohort
value and b.Returns to experience where only β1 and β2 are changed to their 1960-cohort
values. Finally, for C.Child-Care Cost we change g2 to its 1960-cohort value holding
β0, β1 and β2 as well as number and timing of births at their 1940-cohort values. The
residual is then calculated from equation (16).
In order of importance, we ﬁnd that changes in women’s wages account for 67 percent
of changes in women’s employment across cohorts, followed by changes in child-care cost
(21 percent), fertility (9 percent), and the residual term (2 percent).
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Tab. 5: Decomposing the eﬀects of fertility, wages, and child-care costs
(in percent)
Age 20-35 Age 36-43 Age 20-43
A. Fertility: 15% -6% 9%
a. Number of Children, f 20 12 17
b. Timing, a -4 -18 -9
B. Wages: 57% 83% 68%
a. Pure Wage Gap, β0 7 5 6
b. Returns to Experience, β1, β2 50 78 62
C. Child-Care Cost, g2: 26% 14% 21%
Residual: -8% 9% 2%
Fertility + Wages + Child-Care: 100% 100% 100%
Fig. 17: Decomposing the eﬀects of fertility, wages, and child-care costs
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More precisely, we can compare our results to the literature as follows. First, our
implied decrease in the pure gender wage gap is an order of magnitude smaller than
the (lifetime) pure gender wage gap implied by Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003),
namely 2.1 percent24 versus 27 percent. This may be due to the fact that they don’t
take the lifecycle experience eﬀect of children into account. That is, if that was taken
into account, the needed change in the gender wage gap to generate the increase in
the observed wage—a function of accumulated human capital in Jones, Manuelli, and
McGrattan (2003)’s model—would be much smaller. Their change in the gender wage
gap accounts for almost the entire change in married female hours worked, while our
(much smaller) change accounts for only 6 percent of the change observed in the data.
Second, the implied change in the marginal return to experience at age 23 between
the 1940 and 1960 cohorts (i.e. from the year 1963 to the year 1983) is about 40 percent25
while Olivetti (2006) ﬁnds that the marginal return to experience at age 20 between the
1970s and 1990s increased by only 25 percent. This diﬀerence could be explained by
the fact that Olivetti’s estimates are obtained using all ages of women at each point in
time, while our measures are cohort-speciﬁc. While Olivetti ﬁnds that changes in returns
to experience account for 96 percent of the change observed in the data, we ﬁnd that
they account for only 62 percent despite the larger exogenous change. This diﬀerence in
ﬁndings may be due to the fact that Olivetti uses the intensive margin of hours worked,
while we consider the extensive margin.
Third, Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) ﬁnd that child care costs decreased
by 5 percent to 20 percent while our estimate implies a decrease of 18.5 percent.26 A
24The parameter β0 increases from 5.3117 to 5.3217. The relative wage of women to men at age 20
therefore changes from e
5.3117
e5.7083 = 0.6726 to 0.6794. Hence, the change in the pure gender wage gap is
0.3206−0.3274
0.3274 = −0.021.
25The parameter β1 increased from 0.0105 to 0.0149. Since the eﬀect of β2 is negligibly small early in
life, the percentage change is 0.0149−0.01050.0105 = 0.42
26The parameter g2 decreased from 0.07 to 0.057. Hence, we get
0.057−0.07
0.07 = −0.185.
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decrease of 20 percent in their model can account for slightly more than half of the
increase in female labor force participation, while in our model changes in the price of
child-care alone account for only 21 percent of the change observed in the data.
Finally, we ﬁnd that changes in fertility patterns have the largest impact for the age
group 20-35 and changes in the number and timing of births oﬀset one another. Finally,
changes in fertility patterns also aﬀect changes in women’s life-cycle employment in an
indirect way through their interaction with changes in women’s wages and cost of child-
care.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented data on employment and fertility for cohorts of married women born
between 1940 and 1960. Using a life-cycle model of married female employment with
experience accumulation, our analysis shows the following. First, fertility patterns (total
number of children ever born and age of mother at birth of ﬁrst child) are crucial de-
terminants of the life-cycle employment proﬁle for married women. Second, changes in
gender wage diﬀerentials and costs of children needed to account for changes in women’s
life-cycle employment are smaller than previously found in the literature once we take
into account changes in fertility patterns. Third, changes in women’s wages (in particular,
returns to experience) have the largest impact on women’s employment decisions.
One open question is: What caused the decrease and delay in fertility? Our current
work in progress is to endogenize fertility and timing of births decisions to ask whether
changes in wages can also account for the delay in fertility. Preliminary results show
that the delay, though positive, is largely left unaccounted for. Something else seems
to have caused the delay in fertility. Several related questions come to mind: How is
fertility related to the marriage decision? Was the change in fertility decisions simply
due to cultural changes and changes in social norms? In what sense and can we attempt
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to measure these changes? The answers to these questions are closely intermingled and
hard to disentangle from the question about why women tend to have children later and
take care of them diﬀerently than they used to. They are however crucial to set up
a useful model of fertility choices in terms of number and timing of births as well as
child-care arrangements.
The other open question is why wage levels and returns to experience changed more
for women than they did for men. Besides straight out discrimination, many other more
readily quantiﬁable hypotheses can be considered. Changing occupational opportunities
due to the rise in the service sector, changing educational investments pertaining more
to women than men because of initial conditions are only a few avenues to be explored
further.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Life-cycle Patterns by Education
We present data for life-cycle employment proﬁles and fertility by education.
7.1.1 Employment
Employment proﬁles over the life-cycle and their changes across cohorts diﬀer consider-
ably by education. They are mostly increasing in age for high school graduates, while
college women tend to work a lot before childbearing ages, then drop out of the labor
force and ﬁnally join the labor force again after childbearing ages (see Figures 18 and 19,
respectively).
Fig. 18: Life-Cycle Employment Proﬁle of Married Women by Cohort - High School
Graduates
20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Age
P
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
Born in 1940
1960
However, changes in employment rates across cohorts are the largest at childbearing
ages. Between age 20 and 35, employment rates increased on average by 26 and 27
percentage points for high school and college graduates respectively. Between age 36
and 50, employment only increases by 10 and 4 percentage points for HS and College
graduates.
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Fig. 19: Life-Cycle Employment Proﬁle of Married Women by Cohort - College Graduates
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7.1.2 Fertility
In Table 6, we present the total number of children ever born and the average age of
mother at birth of ﬁrst child by education. Fertility levels decreases with education.
However, changes are the largest for High School graduates women. On the other hand,
age of mother at birth of ﬁrst child increases with education and changes are the largest
for College educated women.
Tab. 6: Fertility Levels and Timing of Births by Education (Std. Dev.)
1940 Cohort 1960 Cohort
Total Number of Children Ever Born:
High School 2.6 (1.2) 2.1 (1.1)
College 2.3 (1.2) 1.8 (1.1)
Age of Mother at Birth of First Child:
High School 23.3 (2.7) 25.5 (4.7)
College 25.9 (3.7) 29.2 (4.6)
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7.2 Comparative Statics
We derive the comparative statics of ∗ with work experience, h, coeﬃcients of Mincer
wage equation, {βi}i=0,1,2, and women’s type, θ. Consider two women of type θ who have
the same number of years of work experience in period t, hAt = h
B
t . Suppose that woman A
receives a productivity shock above the reservation shock, while woman B receives a shock
below. Next period, we have hAt+1 = h
B
t+1 + 1. This aﬀects their respective continuation
values as well as the period utility if they decide to work (since the wage is increasing in
the number of years of work experience). The indirect utility both, from working and not
working, is higher for woman A than woman B (see Figure 20), but the diﬀerence in the
former is larger than the diﬀerence in the latter. Hence, ∗t+1(h
A, βi, θ) < 
∗
t+1(h
B, βi, θ)
and woman A is more likely to work in the future. By analogy, the same comparative
statics apply for βi, holding everything else the same. Women are more likely to work,
following a decrease in the gender wage gap due to an increase in β0 or an increase in the
returns to experience due to an increase in (β1, β2).
Fig. 20: Comparative Statics - hA > hB
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Next, consider two women who have a diﬀerent number of children over their life-
time, fA < fB, but the same age at birth of ﬁrst child, aA = aB. Here comparative
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statics depend on the relative magnitudes of time and goods costs. For sake of intuition,
consider two extreme cases. In the ﬁrst case, children are costly if the woman works,
while in the second, they are costly if she doesn’t work. Therefore, in case (1) (case (2)),
women with fewer children are more (less) likely to work. In the data section above,
we described employment by number of children in the household and found that it is
decreasing. Calibrating to this fact, parameters adjust such that a version of case (1)
applies. Therefore, under our parameters, the reservation shock is higher for women
who have more children over their life-time. Thus, they are less likely to work. Finally,
consider two women who diﬀer in their age at birth of ﬁrst child, i.e. aA > aB, but will
have the same number of children over their life-time, fA = fB. Then for some periods,
woman A will have fewer children than woman B. She will therefore be more likely to
work, everything else the same. However, once she starts to have children herself, she
will have younger children in the household than woman B. Since younger children are
costlier, she is less likely to work during those periods.
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we perform sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our calibrated
parameters. We analyze the impact of a 10-percent change in our calibrated parameters
on the goodness of ﬁt for life-cycle participation and participation by number of children
at age 30 and 40. Changing only 1 parameter at a time, we choose women’s wages
coeﬃcients, the marginal utility of leisure, and parameters for the continuation value to
minimize the squared deviation between the life-cycle employment rates from the model
and their data counterpart. For example, to assess the impact of a 10-percent increase
in the base goods cost, g1, we set the vector, ψ = {β0, β1, β2, A, a1, a2}, to minimize the
following quadratic form:
Qs(ψ; ξs(g1)) =
∑
t
Φ−1t,t (Pt(ψ; ξ
s(g1))− P d,1940t )2 (17)
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where ξs(g1) = {{ϕ1940f }, {ϕ1940a|f }, σc, σl, 1.1g1, g2, t1, t2, ρ, η, δ, {βmi }, tw, σ}. Let ψs(g1) =
argmin
ψ∈Ψ
Qs(ψ; ξs(g1)), the solution to the above system. We calculate the percentage
change (elasticity) in the coeﬃcients of women’s wages and marginal utility of leisure as
follows: λψi,g1 =
ψsi (g1)−ψci
ψci
/∆g1
g1
. We assess the impact of a 10-percent change in parameters
for preferences, cost of children, and the standard deviation of the productivity shock and
present our results in Table 7.
Since the marginal utility of consumption for women with children is very high, the re-
lationship between employment and number of children ﬂattens out following an increase
in the base goods cost of children, g1 (relative to g2).
27 The decrease in employment rates
of women with 0 and 1 child is achieved through an increase in the marginal utility of
leisure, A, and a decrease in returns to work experience, (β1, β2). On the other hand,
when the base time cost t1 is high relative to t2, the marginal utility of leisure for women
with children is very high. As a result, the relationship between employment and number
of children becomes steeper. Finally, the goodness of ﬁt for life-cycle employment rates
is very sensitive to values of ρ, which provides strong support for the estimate of Hotz
and Miller (1988).
The wage-experience proﬁle and the marginal utility of leisure are also very sensitive
to the coeﬃcient of risk aversion, σc and the intertemporal elasticity in labor supply,
σl, which conﬁrms the low values for σc in life-cycle models with borrowing constraints
(see Keane and Wolpin 2001). Note that since the marginal utility of leisure decrease
when σl increases, employment by number of children ﬂattens out. Finally, changes in
the standard deviation of the productivity shocks have mild eﬀects on the goodness of ﬁt
for life-cycle participation and participation by number of children at age 30 and 40.
27For very high values of g1 relative to g2, the marginal utility of consumption for women with children
is so high that employment rates increases with the number of children, which is counterfactual.
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Tab. 7: Impact of 10% Increase in Calibrated Parameters
β0 β1 β2 A Q
s(ψs(·); ξs(·))
g1 -0.0011 -0.0538 -0.1353 0.0052 0.05
t1 0.0006 -0.1811 -0.1142 -0.0019 0.03
ρ 0.0008 -0.1646 -0.3764 -0.0080 0.63
σc 0.2979 -1.0467 -0.2870 -0.1289 0.22
σl -0.0942 -3.4774 3.2853 -0.6017 0.10
σ -0.0013 -0.2331 0.18568 0.0045 0.18
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